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EUROPEAN UNION’S AND NATO’S POLICY 
TOWARD THE MEDITERRANEAN AT THE BEGINNING 
OF THE 21ST CENTURY
President Sarkozy – ‘(...) I want to reach out to all of the people of the Mediterranean to tell them 
that everything will unfold in the Mediterranean. Th at we must overcome all the hatred and leave 
in its place the great dream of peace and the great dream of civilization. I want to tell them that 
the time has come to build at its center a Mediterranean Union, that will like Europe and Africa... 
What was done for Europe 60 years ago, we will do today for a Mediterranean Union. (...)’
Nicolas Sarkozy’s acceptance speech, Paris, May 6th, 2007
Th e South and East Mediterranean and the Middle East is an area of vital strategic 
importance to the European Union, which both the EU Council and the European 
Commission have identifi ed as key external relations priority for the EU. Th e EU’s 
proximity policy towards the Mediterranean region is governed by the global and 
comprehensive Euro-Mediterranean Partnership launched at the 1995 Barcelona 
Conference between the European Union and it’s 12 Mediterranean Partners (hence 
called the Barcelona Process of overarching bilateral and multilateral EU relations). 
Th e partners are Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia (Maghreb); Egypt, Israel, Jordan, the 
Palestinian Authority, Lebanon, Syria (Mashrek); Turkey, Cyprus and Malta; Libya 
currently has observer status at certain meetings. European Union’s policy toward 
Mediterranean is very important for such EU members like: Spain, Italy, Greece, Por-
tugal and France. What is the defi nition of the Mediterranean region? Th e commonly 
held belief is that from the geographical point of view the area consists of the follow-
ing countries: Portugal, Spain, France, Italy, Slovenia, Croatia, Montenegro, Albania, 
Greece, Turkey, Cyprus, Malta, Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Palestinian Authority, Egypt, 
Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco. Th is area is not uniform; some countries are 
members of the European Union, others are members of the African Union, and 
Union of the Arab Maghreb, some are well-developed, others have serious economic 
problems. Th e Mediterranean basin includes countries as diverse as Spain and Libya, 
Israel and Algeria, with dramatically diff erent political systems and levels of develop-
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ment. From a political point of view the region consists of the above countries as well 
as Jordan, Mauritania, and Iraq. Justyna Zając1 describes a history of the cooperation: 
in 1972 is the beginning of the cooperation when the EEC had formulated its Global 
Mediterranean Policy (GMP). Th e GMP agreements mainly consisted of commercial 
co-operation (preferential trade agreements), fi nancial and economic co-operation 
(aid) and social co-operation (directed towards immigrants). In 1990 the EU adopted 
the Renovated Mediterranean Policy, which increased the budget for fi nancial co-
operation. Th e Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Ministers of Foreign Aff airs, held 
in Barcelona on 27–28 November 1995, marked the starting point of the Euro-Med-
iterranean Partnership (Barcelona Process), a wide framework of political, economic 
(the principle of the creation of the Euro-Mediterranean free trade economic zone) 
and social relations between the Member States of the European Union and Partners 
of the Southern Mediterranean.2 Th e aim of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership is 
to turn the Mediterranean basin into an area of dialogue, exchange and co-operation 
guaranteeing peace, stability and prosperity; strengthen the political dialogue, de-
velopment of economic and fi nancial co-operation, social, cultural and human di-
mension, and by 2010 establish a free-trade area. It makes economic transition and 
free trade the central issue of the EU fi nancial co-operation with the Mediterranean 
region. Th e Barcelona process, that started in 1995, followed aft er 20 years of bilateral 
trade and development co-operation between the EU, its member states and 12 Med-
iterranean countries (Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Jordan, Israel, Lebanon, Malta, Moroc-
co, Th e Palestinian Authority, Tunisia (Maghreb), Turkey and Syria (Mashrek). Th e 
key objectives listed in the Barcelona Declaration are the following: fi rst, to establish 
a common Euro-Mediterranean area of peace and stability based on fundamental 
principles (political and security partnership); second, to create an area of shared 
prosperity through the progressive establishment of a free-trade area between the EU 
and its partners and among the Mediterranean partners (the Euro-Mediterranean 
Free Trade Area), accompanied by substantial EU fi nancial support for economic 
transition and for the social and economic consequences in the partner countries 
(economic and fi nancial partnership); third, to develop human resources, promote 
understanding between cultures and develop free and fl ourishing civil society (social, 
cultural and human partnership).3 In the Barcelona Declaration (1995), the Euro-
Mediterranean Partners agreed on the establishment of the Euro-Mediterranean Free 
Trade Area (EMFTA) by the target date of 2010. Th is is to be achieved by means of 
the Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements negotiated and concluded between 
the European Union and the Mediterranean Partners, together with free trade agree-
ments between the partners themselves. Turkey signed in 1995 an Association Agree-
ment establishing the defi nite phase of a customs union with the EU. Together with 
1 J. Zając, Th e European Union’s Policy in the Mediterranean, Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, Toruń 
2002, p. 14.
2 A. Kołakowska, 10 years of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership-Balance and Perspectives, “PISM 
Research Papers” 2006, no. 3.
3 P. Borkowski, Th e Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, Trio, Warszawa 2005, p. 85.
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European Free Trade Association (EFTA) this zone will include some 40 States and 
600–800 million consumers, i.e. one of the world’s most important trade entities. Th e 
European Commission, being in charge of trade and economic co-operation with 
the South and Eastern Mediterranean, is responsible for preparing, negotiating and 
implementing Association Agreements. Th e new generation of Euro-Mediterranean 
Association Agreements provides for the gradual implementation of bilateral free 
trade. Th e Euro-Mediterranean Free-Trade Area foresees free trade in manufactured 
goods and progressive liberalisation of trade in agricultural products.4 Negotiations 
for Agreements already concluded include those with Tunisia (1995), Israel (1995), 
Morocco (1996), Jordan (1997), Egypt (2001), Algeria (2002), Lebanon (2002) and 
Syria (2004). Th ose with Tunisia (1998), Morocco (2000), Israel (2000), Jordan (2002) 
and Egypt (2004) have been ratifi ed and are in force. Th ese agreements cover a large 
variety of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), economic, social, cultural 
and fi nancial co-operation themes as well as free trade. 
Th e Mediterranean Free Trade Zone (MEDA) programme is the principal fi nan-
cial instrument of the European Union for the implementation of the Euro-Mediter-
ranean Partnership. Th e programme off ers technical and fi nancial support measures 
to accompany the reform of economic and social structures in the Mediterranean 
partners and it is implemented by DG EuropAid. EuropeAid implements the EC co-
operation policy. It comprises a “geographic” and a “thematic” window (Democracy 
and human rights, co-fi nancing with les NGOs, Food Security) and Antipersonnel 
Landmines). In addition to its structural co-operation policy, EC helps disfavoured 
people. Th is aid is implemented by the Echo Offi  ce. Th e legal basis of the MEDA 
Programme is the 1996 MEDA Regulation (Council Regulation no EC/1488/96). 
Th is Regulation was amended in November 2000 and is usually called MEDA II. 
Th e main areas of intervention and objectives are directly derived from those of the 
1995 Barcelona Declaration. It established the MED Committee to allow EU Member 
States to advise the European Commission in implementing the MEDA Programme. 
Th e Committee gives its opinion on the programming documents. Th e MEDA pro-
gramme has a double vocation: bilateral and regional.
MEDA resources are subject to programming: Strategy papers covering the pe-
riod 2000–2006 are established at national and regional level. Based on these papers, 
three-year national indicative programmes (NIPs) are drawn up jointly for the bi-
lateral channel, and a regional indicative programme (RIP) covers the multilateral 
activities. Th e indicative programmes follow the 1996 Council guidelines. Annually 
adopted fi nancing plans are derived from the NIPs and the RIP. Th e strategy papers, 
NIPs and the RIP are established in liaison with the European Investment Bank. In 
2004 the European Union promoted a European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), that 
aims at increasing the relationships with the countries that neighbour the European 
Union, so called by many authors like Emerson ‘Wider Europe’, granting them ‘every-
4 M. Tovias, Th e Economic Impact of the Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area on Mediterranean Non-
Member Countries, “Mediterranean Politics” 1997, no. 2. 
Rafał Wordliczek986
thing but EU institutions’ in order to avoid drawing new lines on the Continent and 
to promote a ‘more secure Europe in a better world’. Th e instruments set in the pro-
gram have a bilateral nature and are directed towards Eastern and Southern Europe 
as well as the Caucasus. Th e EU Commission usually draws an Action Plan with the 
country involved, with the intention of increasing its economic and social standards, 
along with stability, rule of law and democratization. Th e European Neighbourhood 
Policy applies to the EU’s immediate neighbours by land or sea – Algeria, Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Moldova, Mo-
rocco, Occupied Palestinian Territory, Syria, Tunisia and Ukraine. Although Russia 
is also a neighbour of the EU, the relations are instead developed through a Strategic 
Partnership covering four “common spaces”.5
Table  1
Th e bilateral and regional MEDA programme 
Bilateral co-operation Regional co-operation
At the bilateral level the priorities for MEDA are: 
•  support to economic transition: the aim is to pre-
pare for the implementation of free trade through 
increasing competitiveness with a view to achiev-
ing sustainable economic growth, in particular 
through development of the private sector 
•  strengthening the socio-economic balance: the 
aim is to alleviate the short-term costs of eco-
nomic transition through appropriate measures 
in the fi eld of social policy. 
Th e priorities are to be decided taking into ac-
count the stage of the development of each coun-
try’s economy and society as well as the capacity 
of it’s institutions, i.e. promotion of programmes 
that could contribute to the development of de-
mocracy and respect of human rights.
Regional and multilateral co-operation refl ects the 
progress made in the framework of the Barcelona 
Process in taking action at a multilateral level on is-
sues of common concern, as laid down in the agreed 
declaration, and strengthening activities in support 
of decentralized co-operation. Th e regional pro-
grammes cover the three domains of the Barcelona 
Declaration.
Th e central element of the European Neighbourhood Policy is the bilateral ENP 
Action Plans agreed between the EU and each partner. Th ese set out an agenda of 
political and economic reforms with short and medium-term priorities. Implementa-
tion of the ENP Action Plans (agreed in 2005 with Israel, Jordan, Moldova, Morocco, 
the Palestinian Authority, Tunisia and Ukraine, in 2006 with Armenia, Azerbaijan 
and Georgia, and in 2007 with Egypt and Lebanon) is underway. Algeria, having only 
recently ratifi ed its Association Agreement with the EU, has chosen not to negotiate 
an Action Plan yet.6 
5 F. Atina, Th e Building of Regional Security Partnership and the Security Culture Divide in the Mediter-
ranean Region, Institute of European Studies, University of California, Berkeley 2004, p. 67.
6 A. Kołakowska, European Neighbourhood Policy – the Mediterranean Region, “PISM Research Pa-
pers” 2004, no. 50. 
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Finally, worth-mentioning is the latest idea of the EU: Th e Union for the Medi-
terranean (French: Union pour la Méditerranée; previously known as Mediterranean 
Union, French: Union méditerranéenne) is a proposed community of European Un-
ion member states and countries bordering the Mediterranean Sea planned to be 
established in July 2008. Th is idea is being put forth by the newly elected President of 
France, Nicolas Sarkozy.7 All regional diplomats and experts agree that this is a vital 
idea. It would be accepted if the proposed alliance were not presented as a replica of 
the European Union. Creating Th e Union for the Mediterranean has been around for 
at least a decade. But the energetic French president, Nicolas Sarkozy, has breathed 
new life into the concept as he’s jetted around the region meeting with area leaders in 
what many analysts see as an attempt to boost France’s role as a leader in internation-
al relations. He fi rst brought this idea up during the presidential campaign last year. 
It was central to his foreign policy programme. In a nutshell, Sarkozy proposed a re-
gional political and economic alliance of Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, France, Greece, Is-
rael, Italy, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Malta, Morocco, Palestine, Portugal, Spain, Syria, 
Tunisia, and Turkey. Th e German Chancellor insisted that the union should include 
not only the seven coastal Mediterranean EU countries, but all 27 EU members, that 
is, 38 participants instead of the initial 18. Sarkozy had to accept this because without 
German support, any European idea is doomed to fail in Brussels. Th e union though 
primarily economic, would also involve member countries in discussions over con-
troversial issues such as Turkey’s EU membership, illegal immigration, counter-ter-
rorism, energy security, the Israel-Palestinian confl ict and would provide another 
forum where Israel and its Arab neighbours could participate together. Sarkozy has 
said that he wants the countries ringing the Mediterranean to form a council and 
hold regular summit meetings under a rotating presidency and envisions it as being 
a bridge between Europe and Muslim world and between Europe, Africa, and the 
Middle East. On one hand, for European countries like France and Spain – which are 
increasingly feeling the eff ects of North African poverty and political insecurity – the 
idea of a new regional grouping for the Mediterranean is attractive precisely because 
it may off er a forum for tackling the diverse region’s many problems. Egypt, Tunisia, 
and Spain have attached at least tentative support to the idea in recent months, de-
spite the absence of any concrete suggestions from France as to how exactly such an 
entity would work. Also Israel hopes the new Mediterranean Union will help improve 
relations with the Arab world, but Arabs warn against any attempt to bring normal-
ization in through the back door. On the other hand, some countries from many 
reasons do not support the French initiative. It was suggested by French President 
Nicolas Sarkozy as an alternative to Turkish membership of the European Union, 
which would instead form the backbone of the new union, but with the scaling down 
of plans in March 2008 that idea has been abandoned.8 Turkey has strongly criticized 
7 France in ‘Semantic Shift ’ over Proposed Mediterranean Union, EurActiv.com, http://www.euractiv.
com/en/enlargement/france-semantic-shift -proposed-mediterranean-union/article-170629 (10.09.2009).
8 R. Goldirowa, Turkey Slams Sarko’s Mediterranean Union, “Business Week”, May 18, 2007, http://
www.businessweek.com/globalbiz/content/may2007/gb20070518_262522.htm?campaign_id=rss_daily 
(11.11.2009).
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a proposal, fl oated by France’s new president Nicolas Sarkozy, to set up a “Mediter-
ranean Union” as an alternative to the country’s bid for full EU membership, urging 
the French leader to respect the commitments of the past. When Turkey was off ered 
a guarantee in March 2008 that it would not be an alternative to the EU, Turkey ac-
cepted the invitation to participate.9 Northern European states like Germany are also 
chilly on the idea, which they fear may exclude them and could undermine European 
Union (EU) projects for the region. Israel is engaged in peace talks with the Palestin-
ians, who are also unwilling to see the Union for the Mediterranean as a vehicle for 
papering over diff erences between the two sides.10 In addition, Libya does not want to 
join the alliance because it sees it as a weapon to destroy Maghreb unity. But without 
acceptance of these countries, the union will be somewhat lopsided. Since 2001 the 
European countries more deeply are involved in the Mediterranean as members of 
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. Prior to 2001, one of the major programmes of 
cooperation is the NATO Mediterranean Dialogue, which in 1994 began to address 
the Mediterranean security challenges. It refl ected the Alliance’s view that security in 
Europe is closely linked to security and stability in the Mediterranean and it involves 
seven non-NATO countries, Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Israel, Mauritania, Morocco and 
Tunisia, which take part in the programme with a substantial grade of fl exibility.11 
On 12 September 2001 NATO implemented Article 5 of the Washington Treaty 
following the 11 September attacks against the United States. Following US requests, 
NATO subsequently agreed to implement eight specifi c measures to expand the op-
tions available in the “War on Terror”. Th ese measures included the deployment of 
elements of NATO’s Standing Naval Forces to the Eastern Mediterranean in order 
to provide a NATO presence and demonstrate resolve. Th e NATO operation “Ac-
tive Endeavour” formally began on 26 October 2001, when the activation order was 
issued. However, patrolling in the Eastern Mediterranean had already started on 
6 October, when the Standing Naval Force Mediterranean was dispatched to conduct 
maritime presence operations in support of the international campaign against ter-
rorism. Under Operation Active Endeavour, NATO ships are patrolling the Mediter-
ranean, monitoring shipping and providing escorts to non-military vessels through 
the Straits of Gibraltar to help detect, deter and protect against terrorist activity. Th e 
aims of the military mission are: keeping seas safe, protecting shipping, controlling 
suspect vessels, and closer cooperation with partners. Th e operation’s mission is to 
conduct naval operations in the Mediterranean to actively demonstrate NATO’s re-
solve and solidarity. Operation Active Endeavour is one of the measures resulting 
9 RIA Novosti – Opinion and Analysis, Sarkozy’s Mediterranean Union, http://en.rian.ru/analy-
sis/20080305/100754813.html (25.07.2009).
10 M. Schattner, Israel Sees Mediterranean Union as Way to Boost Arab Ties, “Middle East Times”, July 
10, 2008, Warszawa, http://www.metimes.com/Politics/2008/07/10/israel_sees_mediterranean_union_
as_way_to_boost_arab_ties/afp (10.07.2008).
11 P. Wyganowski, NATO’s Defensive Policy in the Mediterranean, Wydawnictwo Obrony Narodowej, 
Warszawa 1994, p. 82.
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from NATO’s decision to implement Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, expanding 
the options available in the “War on Terror”. 
For the fi rst time in NATO’s history, Alliance assets have been deployed in sup-
port of Article 5 operations. NATO has contributed Airborne Warning and Control 
Systems aircraft  (AWACS) to the United States and has also deployed elements of its 
Standing Naval Forces to the Eastern Mediterranean. AWACS provide air surveil-
lance and early warning capability by transmitting data to command and control cen-
tres on land, sea or in the air. Th e naval assets of Standing Naval Force Mediterranean 
(STANAVFORMED), which were participating in Exercise Destined Glory 2001 
off  the southern coast of Spain, were re-assigned in order to provide an immediate 
NATO military presence in the Eastern Mediterranean. Operation Active Endeavour 
is conducted by Vice Admiral Roberto Cesaretti, Italian Navy, Commander Allied 
Maritime Component Command Naples (CC-Mar Naples) from his headquarters in 
Naples, Italy, through a Task Force deployed to the Eastern Mediterranean, named 
Task Force Endeavour (TFE) and, from 10 March 2003, a Task Force deployed to the 
Strait of Gibraltar (STROG) (NATO Review, 2005). Admiral Cesaretti indicated the 
necessity of strong co-operation between Europe and the United States in the Medi-
terranean Sea region in the mission Active Endeavour. In his opinion the success of 
the operation is connected with Euro-American collaboration. On the other hand, 
there are European politicians who do not support European countries’ involvement 
in the mission Active Endeavour. On 16 March 2004 NATO announced that the Area 
of operation Active Endeavour was extended to the whole Mediterranean and that 
EAPC/PfP Partners, Mediterranean Dialogue countries and other selected nations 
will be asked to support it, including through their active participation.12 While con-
ducting counter-terrorist operations in the Mediterranean Sea, ships assigned to Op-
eration Active Endeavour have also assisted the Greek government with the preven-
tion of illegal immigration. On March 23rd, 2006, NATO forces alerted the Hellenic 
Coast Guard of a vessel named “M/V Crystal”. Th e coast guard units intercepted the 
ship and arrested the captain and crew who were attempting to smuggle 126 illegal 
immigrants. 
Questions – key issues for the future
Will the Mediterranean region be a place of rivalry between the EU and the US (Mid-
dle East Free Trade Agreement, Middle East Partnership Initiative)? 
Diff erent points of view inside the EU: Eastern countries (Poland, Baltic states) 
encourage EU to focus on the process of enlargement the Union (Ukraine), whereas 
others (France, Italy) want to involve deeper in the Mediterranean co-operation. Mis-
understandings between the old EU members: Germany does not accept the French 
12 “NATO Review” 2005, www.nato.int/docu/review/2005/issue3/polish/main_pr.htm (30.03.2008). 
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policy toward the Mediterranean area and Berlin is against the idea of creating the 
Union for the Mediterranean proposed by president Sarkozy. In a key policy state-
ment ahead of the EU Treaty signing ceremony in Lisbon, German Chancellor Ange-
la Merkel has criticized the French president’s plans for closer co-operation between 
countries on both sides of the Mediterranean Sea. In a government declaration deliv-
ered before the Bundestag on 12 December 2007, Merkel said that “there must not be 
a Europe of private functions”. At a meeting with Sarkozy in Hannover on March 3rd, 
2008 German Chancellor Angela Merkel has fi nally agreed to the union’s formation. 
However, the alliance that Europe will try on is very diff erent from what the energetic 
and ambitious French president suggested initially. Moreover, nobody can say how 
many countries will join the union and whether it will be viable at all. Merkel was 
the fi rst to declare that Berlin will not let it happen. She said Berlin will not allow EU 
funds to be spent on a union that will not include the majority of EU members (this 
was Sarkozy’s initial idea). Merkel and Sarkozy have fallen out over his proposal. Off  
the record, German diplomats admitted that Merkel is very irritated, and has called 
Sarkozy “hyperactive and boastful”. It is surprising that they met in Hannover at all. 
A regular French-German summit in Bavaria was scheduled for that day, but Paris 
suspended it for three months – ostensibly because of the president’s timetable. As 
a result, aft er the start of the CeBIT-2008 high tech fair, Merkel and Sarkozy settled 
their diff erences over the proposed alliance at curtailed talks. Th e German Chancel-
lor insisted that the union should include not only the seven coastal Mediterranean 
EU countries, but all 27 EU members, that is, 38 participants instead of the initial 18. 
Sarkozy had to accept this because without German support, any European idea is 
doomed to fail in Brussels. But as a result, Germany has overloaded Sarkozy’s Medi-
terranean boat so much that it may not be able to stay afl oat. He had to agree to an-
other idea of Merkel’s. She wants the union to continue the Barcelona process – dia-
logue with the participation of all EU and Mediterranean countries. Started in 1995, 
it has now almost ground to a halt. Non-EU experts blame this on the cumbersome 
Brussels bureaucratic machine, and the reluctance of some countries to take part in 
the process that has nothing to do with their national interests.
